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Contextualism is the view that the extension of perspectival claims (involving e.g. 
predicates of personal taste or epistemic modals) depends on the context of utterance. 
Relativism is the view that the extension of perspectival claims depends on the context 
of assessment. Both views make concrete, empirically testable predictions about how 
such claims are used by ordinary English language speakers. This chapter surveys some 
of the recent empirical literature on the topic and presents four new experiments (total 
N=724). Consistent with contextualism and inconsistent with relativism, the results 
suggest that the extension of perspectival claims depends on the context of utterance, 





Let me not waste your time: There are three major truth-conditional accounts that 
purport to explain the semantics of perspectival claims regarding e.g. personal taste,1 
                                               
1 See inter alia Kölbel (2002, 2004, 2009), Lasersohn (2005, 2008, 2009, 2017), Glanzberg (2007, 2021), 
MacFarlane (2007, 2014), López de Sa (2007, 2015, this volume), Recanati (2007), Stojanovic (2007, 2017), 
Stephenson (2007), Saebo (2009), Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009), Moltmann (2010), Barker (2010), Egan 
(2010), Sundell (2011), Schaffer (2011), Huvenes (2012), Pearson (2013, this volume), Kennedy (2013), 
Snyder (2013), Collins (2013), Plunkett & Sundell (2013), Marques & García-Carpintero (2014), Marques 
(2014a, 2014b, 2018), Clapp (2015), Ferrari (2015, 2016), Hincu (2015), Zakkou (2015, 2019a, 2019b), Kneer 
(2015, 2020, 2021),  Kennedy & Willer (2016), Zeman (2016a, 2016b, 2017, 2020), Dinges (2017a, 2017b, 
this volume), Kneer, Zeman & Vicente (2017), Wyatt (2018, 2021, this volume), Kindermann (2019, 2020), 
Kaiser & Rudin (2020), Dinges & Zakkou (2020, 2021), Hincu & Zeman (forthcoming), Kaiser & Stojanovic 
(this volume), Rudolph (this volume), Willer & Kennedy (this volume).  
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epistemic modality,2 or aesthetic evaluation.3 They differ with respect to two orthogonal 
dimensions, namely: (i) Whether the perspectival element (e.g. a standard of taste or an 
epistemic perspective) is conceived as part of the content of the proposition uttered, or 
as a parameter in the circumstance of evaluation, and (ii) whether the extension of such 
claims is sensitive to the context of utterance, or whether it can, at times, be sensitive to 
a context of assessment. (For recent reviews of the literature, see e.g. Stojanovic, 2017 
and Glanzberg, 2021).  
According to indexical contextualism (e.g. Glanzberg, 2007, Stojanovic, 2007, 
2017, Cappelen & Hawthorne, 2009, Schaffer, 2011) an utterance of “Salmon is 
delicious” features a tacit, quasi-indexical perspectival element in the proposition’s 
content which is drawn from the context of utterance. Nonindexical contextualists (e.g. 
Kölbel, 2002, 2004, 2009; Recanati, 2007) argue that a position of this sort cannot 
accommodate the phenomenon of faultless disagreement. The proposition itself, they 
suggest, is taste-neutral, and the standard of taste is, like worlds or times, part of the 
Kaplanian circumstance of evaluation (or a Lewisian index).  
Relativists (e.g. MacFarlane, 2014; Egan, 2007, 2010) agree with nonindexical 
contextualists that perspectival features are best located in the circumstance, and not 
the propositional content. However, and in contrast to both kinds of contextualism, 
relativists look beyond the context of utterance and make room for dynamic updating: 
People’s tastes, aesthetic standards, and epistemic situations can change, and if they do, 
a perspectival claim true at the context of utterance might be false as evaluated from a 
later context of assessment. Here’s MacFarlane:  
 
When our own tastes change, so that a food we used to find pleasant to the taste 
now tastes bad, we may say that we were mistaken in saying that the food was 
“tasty.” When I was a kid, I once told my mother, “Fish sticks are tasty.” Now that 
I have exposed my palate to a broader range of tastes, I think I was wrong about 
                                               
2 See inter alia Kratzer (1977, 2012), Egan (2007,2011), Yalcin (2007), Stephenson (2007), Hawthorne (2007), 
Von Fintel & Gillies (2008,2011), MacFarlane (2010, 2011b, 2014), Schaffer (2011), Dowell (2011, 2017), 
Swanson (2011), Willer (2013), Knobe & Yalcin (2014), Yanovich (2014, 2020),  Khoo (2015), Kneer (2015, 
ms), Beddor & Egan (2018), Marushak (2018), Marushak & Shaw (2020). 
3 See inter alia Schafer (2011), Kölbel (2016), McNally & Stojanovic (2016), Stojanovic (2016, 2017, 2018), 
Marques (2016), Liao & Meskin (2017), Cova et al. (2019), Collins (2020), Bonard et al. (this volume), 
Martínez Marín & Schellekens (this volume), Wallbank & Robson (this volume). 
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that; I’ve changed my mind about the tastiness of fish sticks. So, if someone said, 
“But you said years ago that fish sticks were tasty,” I would retract the earlier 
assertion. I wouldn’t say, “They were tasty then, but they aren’t tasty any more,” 
since that would imply that their taste changed. Nor would I say, “When I said 
that, I only meant that they were tasty to me then.” I didn’t mean that. At the time 
I took myself to be disagreeing with adults who claimed that fish sticks weren’t 
tasty. (2014, pp. 13-14) 
 
What the passage highlights, is that the dynamic nature of the relativist view entails two 
norms of assertion. One, labelled the “Reflexive Truth Rule”, specifies the conditions 
under which one is warranted to make an assertion.  
 
Reflexive Truth Rule: An agent is permitted to assert that p at context c1 only if p 
is true as used at c1 and assessed from c2. (2014, p. 103) 
 
Given that the only context that matters for the making of assertions is the context of 
utterance (or “use”), this might leave “contexts of assessment without any essential role 
to play” (2014, p. 104). However, on the dynamic account of assertion proposed by 
relativists, there’s a second rule in place – a rule which specifies under which conditions 
one must retract an assertion: 
 
Retraction Rule: An agent in context c2 is required to retract an (unretracted) 
assertion of p made at c1 if p is not true as used at c1 and assessed from c2. (2014, 
p. 108) 
 
Naturally, a retraction cannot simply wipe the retracted assertion from the conversational 
record. However, that’s not the point. Instead, in taking back an assertion we attempt 
“to ‘undo’ the normative changes effected by the original speech act”. (MacFarlane 
2014, p. 108; for discussion about retraction in particular, see e.g. Ferrari (2016), Marques 
(2014a, 2018), Kneer (2015, 2021a), Zakkou (2019a), Caponetto (2020), and Dinges (this 
volume)). 
Truth relativism about perspectival expressions is a descriptive theory, which 
makes hypotheses about norms of assertion in ordinary English. The norms in question 
are conventional, non-codified, behavior-dependent rules, which govern our linguistic 
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practice (at least in certain domains). Norms of this kind are social facts, and as such they 
are suited to empirical investigation: We can test whether ordinary language speakers 
are inclined to act in conformity with the proposed linguistic conventions, and whether 
their normative assessments of pertinent perspective-dependent assertions track the 
Truth and Retraction Rules. If this were the case, then the core tenets of relativism are in 
place (though they could possibly be spelled out in terms of competing theories with 
similar explanatory power). If people’s linguistic behavior (and assessment thereof) 
proves inconsistent with the proposed norms of assertion, both the force of the relativist 
critique of contextualism as well as the central pillars of the relativist view itself collapse.  
This paper surveys some recent experiments concerning the norms of assertion 
proposed by relativism (section 2). Amongst ordinary English speakers, there is evidence 
against the Truth Rule (Yalcin & Knobe, 2014; Kneer, 2015, 2021a) and the Retraction 
Rule (Kneer 2015, 2021a, Marques, ms). Moreover, the empirical literature on norms of 
assertion is increasingly converging on the position that such a norm is not factive in the 
first place. Consequently, there’s little reason to assume that the norms of perspectival 
assertions differed in this regard.  
However, there are some interesting diverging findings. Dinges and Zakkou 
(2020) present conflicting results regarding the Truth Rule, reporting a distinct lack of 
agreement with both contextualist and relativist predictions concerning the truth 
assessment of taste claims. Furthermore, according to Knobe & Yalcin (2014), the folk 
seem to agree with some sort of retraction rule for epistemic modal claims (despite 
disagreeing with MacFarlane’s Truth Rule). Both in Dinges and Zakkou’s and in Knobe & 
Yalcin’s experiments, I would like to suggest, the tested target statements might not 
adequately mirror what is at stake in the contextualism/relativism debate.  
To anticipate the findings: In Dinges & Zakkou’s study, the lack of agreement with 
the contextualist predictions might be due to an inadequate formulation of the response 
claim. Three experiments that attempt to remedy this potential shortcoming lend 
support to contextualist truth assessment (sections 3 to 5). Knobe & Yalcin’s study 
concerning a norm of retraction, by contrast, asks participants whether it is “appropriate” 
for a speaker to take back an epistemic modal claim whose prejacent is false at the 
context of assessment. What is appropriate, however, need not be required. Relativists 
like MacFarlane (see quotation above), just like most theorists in the debate concerning 
norms of assertion, however, tend to state their hypothesized rules in terms of what is 
required or mandatory, or what must, ought and should be done. What they are 
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concerned with are core or potentially constitutive rules of assertion, and these can be 
expected to invoke strict normative force. Such rules contrast with peripheral rules that 
help regulate our assertive practices, characterized inter alia by a more lenient normative 
force, of which there surely are many.  It is, for instance, appropriate or commendable 
to express oneself with clarity and precision.  However, neither of these two norms have 
witnessed much attention in the literature about the (central or constitutive) norms of 
assertion, let alone the contextualism/relativism debate. Section 6 thus reports a 
replication of Knobe & Yalcin’s study, both with their original formulation of the retraction 
question, as well as a version that tracks MacFarlane’s Retraction Rule. Whereas people 
– in line with Knobe & Yalcin’s results – find it appropriate to take back epistemic modal 
claims whose prejacent turns out false at the context of assessment, they disagree with 
the assessment that retraction is required.  
Overall, the findings of the three experiments question the adequacy of the 
relativist Truth Rule and the Retraction Rule. The extension of perspectival claims 
depends on the context of utterance, and there is no requirement of any sort to retract 
them at a later context of assessment (although one may sometimes do so).   
  
2. Empirical Data 
 
2.1 Utterance Sensitivity and Retraction for Perspectival Claims 
Let’s begin with the story MacFarlane uses to motivate relativism with respect to 
predicates of personal taste. In several experiments (Kneer, 2015 Chapter 7; 2021a), 
participants were presented with a scenario based on said fish sticks scenario, quoted 
above. The vignette came in two versions, either containing a claim about the truth 
assessment of a previous taste claim [A], or else the requirement for retraction [B]: 
 
FISH STICKS  
John is five years old and loves fish sticks. One day he says to his sister Sally: ‘Fish 
sticks are delicious.’  Twenty years later his taste regarding fish sticks has changed. 
Sally asks him whether he still likes fish sticks and John says he doesn’t anymore.  
 
[A] Sally says: ‘So what you said back when you were five was false.’      
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[B] Sally says: ‘So you are required to take back what you said about fish sticks 
when you were five.’    
   
Q. To what extent do you agree or disagree with Sally’s claim?    
 
Participants responded to the questions on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at 1 with  
‘completely disagree’ and at  with 7 with ‘completely agree’. Advocates of a contextualist 
semantics would hypothesize agreement with both claims of Sally to be low. After all, 
what, on this theory, matters for truth-assessment is the context of utterance, at which 
John’s claim was true.  A relativist semantics, however, would predict agreement with 
Sally’s assertion that John’s original claim was false, since it is false at the context of 
assessment. Given that it is false at the context of assessment, relativists would further 
hypothesize, and given that Sally challenges John, he must retract his original claim.  
Relativists would predict mean agreement with the proposed truth assessment and 
required retraction to be significantly above the midpoint of the scale. Contextualists, by 
contrast, would predict the means to lie significantly below the midpoint of the scale.  
Consistent with contextualism, and inconsistent with relativism, people strongly 
disagreed with the claim that John’s original assertion was false, or that he should retract 
it. Similar results were found for another predicate of personal taste, namely “fun” (the 
“Sandcastle scenario”). Although it is the relativist’s paradigm example, reasonable 
concerns might be voiced concerning the time lag between a childhood claim as to fish 
sticks tastiness and a challenge in adult life. Reducing the time span between the context 
of utterance and the context of assessment, however, does not make a difference (Kneer, 
2021a, Exp. 2, “Salmon scenario”). Figure 1 visually represents the findings. All means 




Figure 1: Mean agreement with the statement that an original taste claim was false at the context of 
utterance and that it must be retracted given preference reversals across different scenarios. Error bars 
denote standard error of the mean.  
 
For a different type of perspectival expression (epistemic modals), Knobe & Yalcin (2014) 
also report evidence for truth-assessment along contextualist lines. Kneer (2015, Ch. 6; 
ms) further finds that assertions such as “John might be in China” are judged truth-
conditionally on a par with “For all I know, John is in China”, the contextualist’s preferred 
interpretation of “might” claims. Marques (ms) reports results favouring a contextualist 
semantics for epistemic modals for native Spanish speakers. Despite considerable 
convergence, there are some findings that call contextualism into question. To these we 
will turn in sections 2.3 and 2.4, after a brief look at the literature on norms of assertion 
that is not directly concerned with perspectival claims.  
 
2.2 Norms of Assertion  
Much of the contextualism/relativism debate centres on the validity of the norms of 
assertion and retraction proposed by relativists. It is thus surprising that the extensive 
literature about norms of assertion in general is hardly discussed in this context. 
However, as I will briefly argue, the latter also casts doubt on the hypotheses that our 
assertions – perspectival or not – are governed by (something like) MacFarlane’s Truth 
Rule or the Retraction Rule.  
 8 
For several decades, philosophers have explored the question what, if anything, 
is required of a speaker to be in a position to assert a certain proposition x (for an 
excellent review, see Pagin, 2014).  On the most demanding (and most widely defended) 
account, in order to assert x, the speaker must know that x (the knowledge account, see 
e.g. Williamson, 1996, 2000; Hawthorne, 2003, Turri, 2011). According to an alternative 
view, for a speaker to assert x, x must simply be true – though need not be known (the 
truth account, see e.g. Weiner, 2005). Both views are factivist, in so far as they require 
the asserted proposition to be true. Nonfactivists argue that if it were only ever 
appropriate to assert true propositions, the number of warranted assertions we make 
would be rather limited. This either suggests that the alleged (factive) norm of assertion 
doesn’t really do much to regulate our communicative behavior (the force and 
importance of such a norm is limited), or else the norm of assertion simply is not factive. 
The position that the central rule of assertion is not tied to propositional truth, it should 
be noted, still allows for the possibility that assertion aims at (the conveying of) truth (see 
Marsili, 2018, 2020, 2021). Some nonfactivists thus propose that in order to assert x, it 
suffices to have a justified belief as to x, even if x is false (the justified belief account, e.g. 
Douven, 2006, Lackey, 2007). Other nonfactivists are more lenient still, and advocate a 
view according to which one can say whatever one believes (the belief account, e.g. 
Bach, 2008, Hindriks, 2007, Mandelkern & Dorst, ms). 
What the debate about norms of assertion can contribute to the debate about 
norms of retraction is this: Only if assertability depends on propositional truth in general 
does it make sense to postulate norms of assertion and retraction for perspectival claims 
that do. If, for instance, the justification account were correct and it were acceptable to 
assert a justified, yet false, proposition, then it is obscure why perspectival claims should 
be governed by something like MacFarlane’s Truth and Retraction Rules.    
Whether human communication is indeed regulated by norms of assertion and 
what these might be is, of course, an empirical question (Douven, 2006; Turri, 2013, 
Pagin, 2016). There is some evidence that points towards a factive norm of assertion 
(Turri, 2011, 2015, for an overview see Turri, 2017). However, studies from other 
researchers have increasingly converged on the position that the norm of assertion is 
most likely justified belief (Kneer, 2018; Reuter & Brössel, 2019, Marsili & Wiegmann, 
2021). In a large cross-cultural study with more than 1000 native speakers from the US, 
Germany and Japan, for instance, it perspired that people think that a speaker should 
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assert that x in cases where x is false yet justified (Figure 2, left), though should not assert 
that x when he has poor evidence for his claim (Figure 2, right).  
 
Figure 2: Left - Proportions of participants of participants who judged a justified claim x assertible and true 
across conditions (true v. false); Right – Proportions of participants who judged a claim assertible and 
justified across conditions (good v. poor evidence). Kneer (2021b, p.2).  
 
In short, given that assertion, in general, does not seem to be governed by a norm tied 
to propositional truth, it is unclear why perspectival claims should.  
 
2.3 Knobe and Yalcin 
Knobe and Yalcin (2014) presented their participants with the following vignette, which 
is closely modelled on an example by MacFarlane (2011): 
 
Sally and George are talking about whether Joe is in Boston. Sally carefully 
considers all the information she has available and concludes that there is no way 
to know for sure.  
Sally says: “Joe might be in Boston.”  
Just then, George gets an email from Joe. The email says that Joe is in Berkeley. 
So George says: “No, he isn’t in Boston. He is in Berkeley.”  
 
On a 7-point Likert-scale, participants were asked to report to what extent they agreed 
or disagreed with one of the following two claims:  
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 [Truth assessment] What Sally said is false.  
 [Retraction] It would be appropriate for Sally to take back what she said.  
 
As a control condition, there was an alternative scenario in which Sally does not say that 
Joe might be in Boston, but simply asserts that he is in Boston. The experiment thus took 
a 2 claim type (indicative v. modal) x 2 question type (truth assessment v. retraction) 




Figure 3: Mean ratings for the nonmodal and modal condition. Error bars designate standard error of the 
mean. (Knobe & Yalcin, 2014, p. 15) 
 
The truth assessment of epistemic modal claims, the results suggest, is sensitive to the 
context of utterance and not the context of assessment. It thus confirms a contextualist 
view of epistemic modals and challenges relativism. What is astonishing is this: Although 
the modal claim is not considered false, it is nonetheless judged appropriate to retract 
it. Beddor & Egan (2018, p.9) thus wonder whether the data really support contextualism. 
There are thus three questions that arise: (i) Why do they differ from other retraction 
findings both for epistemic modals and taste claims that uniformly suggest there is no 
norm of retraction, (ii) what could explain them, and (iii) does the data cast doubt on 
contextualism as. e.g. Beddor & Egan (2018, p.9) wonder? We will come back to these 
questions in Section 5.  
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2.4 Dinges & Zakkou 
In a rich and interesting paper, Dinges & Zakkou report experiments concerning the 
expression “tasty”. Here’s one of their vignettes (2021, p. 8) and the questions they 
asked participants:  
 
Yumble is a new brand of bubblegum. You have never had a Yumble. One day 
you decide to try one. You don’t like the taste. You tell your friend Paul:  
“Yumble isn’t tasty.”  
A few weeks later, you and Paul meet at the check-out in the supermarket. Yumble 
hasn’t changed its taste, but you have now come to like it. You take a pack from 
the shelf. Paul says:  
“That’s funny, I have a clear recollection of you saying ‘Yumble isn’t tasty’ last time 
we met!”  
 
For each of the following responses, please tell us how likely you would be to give 
this response to Paul’s remark in the given context.  
 
“What I said was false. Yumble is tasty.” [Scale from 0-100] 
 “What I said was true. Still, Yumble is tasty.” [Scale from 0-100] 
 
The key idea of the experiment was to have people rate both a relativist response (“What 
I said was false. Yumble is tasty”) and a contextualist response (“What I said was true. 
Still, Yumble is tasty”). In the above scenario, Paul starts out disliking Yumble and comes 
to like it. This type of preference reversal, labelled “not liking to liking” or “NLtoL” by 
Dinges & Zakkou, is complemented by one in the opposite direction, labelled “liking to 
not liking” or “LtoNL” for short. Participants were presented with either the NLtoL or the 




Figure 4: Mean ratings by condition. Error bars show 95% Confidence Intervals. (Dinges & Zakkou, 2021, 
p. 10)  
A mixed ANOVA with truth assessment (true v. false) as the within-subjects variable and 
taste reversal direction (NLtoL v. LtoNL) as the between-subjects variable revealed no 
significant main effect for truth assessment (p=.11) or direction (p=.50). The interaction, 
however, was significant (p=.007, hp2 = .025 a small effect). The data thus suggests two 
main findings: First, neither of the two responses – one relativist, one contextualist – finds 
particular favour or disfavor with participants. The reported likelihood of asserting either 
sit roughly at the midpoint of the scale. Dinges & Zakkou call this finding the Even Split. 
Second, the direction of preference reversal – liking to not liking versus not liking to liking 
– does have an impact on the results (the Direction Effect). 
What should give us pause is the Even Split.4 Contextualists and relativists would 
predict mean endorsement of the response corresponding to their position to be not 
only significantly, but substantially above the midpoint (perhaps around 70%, though 
what counts as “substantially above” is of course debatable).  However, mean 
                                               
4 Personally, I am not particularly worried about the Direction Effect. Note that there are no main effects 
(neither response is significantly more or less favoured across directions of preference reversal) and the 
effect sizes of the interaction are small (Experiment 1: hp2 = .025, Experiment 2: hp2 = .020). Furthermore, 
the main reason why the Direction Effect could be interesting is that it arises in conjunction with the Even 
Split Effect. However, the Even Split will be challenged in the experiments below. What is more, in the 
experiments reported below the Direction Effect is sometimes absent and sometimes it goes in the 
opposite direction of what Dinges & Zakkou report. Given that the effect’s size is always at best small and 
its direction capricious, there simply does not seem to be a robust phenomenon that requires explanation.  
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endorsement for all four values hovers around the midpoint (and for most does not differ 
substantially from it), suggesting that on average, people report it neither likely nor 
unlikely that they’d make either of the two suggested utterances in response to their 
interlocutor’s challenge. These results are at odds with most previous studies – both for 
predicates of personal taste and epistemic modals – which found robust support for 
contextualist and against relativist truth-assessment. What explains the difference in 
results, and how come – overall – there is no significant, let alone substantive 
endorsement of either claim in Dinges & Zakkou’s studies?  
 
2.5 Summary and Outlook 
Let’s take stock: Some results suggest that the truth of perspectival claims is sensitive to 
the context of utterance and that there is no retraction requirement. Findings of this sort 
exist both for taste claims (Kneer, 2015, 2021a) and epistemic modals (Kneer 2015, ms, 
Marques, ms). Knobe & Yalcin’s (2014) data are consistent with these results as regards 
the truth assessment of epistemic modal claims, whose truth is shown to depend on the 
context of utterance, not the context of assessment in several studies. Curiously, 
however, Knobe & Yalcin nonetheless find evidence in favour of a retraction rule, even 
for claims that are deemed true at the relevant context of assessment. Dinges & Zakkou’s 
findings challenge the results of all other studies that converge on contextualist truth 
assessment: People are neither particularly willing, nor particularly unwilling, to answer 
in line with the predictions of contextualism or relativism. Given that the Truth Rule is 
more fundamental than the Retraction rule, I will first explore Dinges & Zakkou’s findings 
in more detail.  
 
3. The Even Split – Experiment 1 
 
In Dinges & Zakkou’s scenario, the reader is in the role of someone whose tastes 
regarding a particular Bubble Gum changes either from liking to not liking or vice versa. 
The reader is then prompted to rate how likely they are to give one of the following two 
responses (here in the case of liking to not liking) upon being challenged by another 
character:  
 
[Relativist] “What I said was false. Yumble is tasty.” [Scale from 0-100] 
[Contextualist] “What I said was true. Still, Yumble is tasty.” [Scale from 0-100] 
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As discussed, participants’ likelihood ratings were roughly at the midpoint of the scale 
for either response (see Figure 4 above). What could explain these results? Perhaps the 
evident place to look is the formulation of the contextualist claim: “What I said was true. 
Still, Yumble is tasty.” Contextualists might object that this is an adequate way of testing 
their predictions. Dinges and Zakkou address precisely this worry:  
 
Contextualists might still complain that we are artificially downgrading the “true” 
response. A more natural way of putting it, they might say, would be something 
like “What I said was true. Still, Yumble is tasty to me now”. Contextualists would 
presumably explain the difference in naturalness between this response and the 
one we offer by assuming some kind of communicative ideal to make tacit 
arguments explicit whenever there is a threat of misunderstanding. Note, 
however, that our primary concern is whether people prefer the “true” to the 
“false” response or vice versa. Even if our “true” response fails to live up to the 
indicated ideal, it should still be preferable to the “false” response according to 
contextualism. After all, even as stated, the “false” response is false according to 
contextualism and the “true” response true. One would normally not prefer to say 
something outright false to saying something true just because the true claim is 
not ideal in terms of a possible misunderstanding. This is not to say, of course, 
that it would be uninteresting to modify the “true” response in the suggested way 
and to see how this affects results. (p.9, FN. 21) 
 
As a card-carrying contextualist, my worry about the formulation of the contextualist 
claim is not quite put to rest by this. According to contextualist semantics, the context 
of assessment simply doesn’t play a meaningful role for truth-assessment. In the 
experiment, following up one’s insistence “What I said was true” with “Still, Yumble is 
tasty” sounds confusing, if not confused, and the expression “still” can trigger a sense 
of contradiction. Dinges and Zakkou argue that “[e]ven if our “true” [i.e. the 
contextualist] response fails to live up to the indicated ideal, it should still be preferable 
to the “false” response according to contextualism.” But this is not evident. If, as 
suggested, the “true” response sounds confused, it remains unclear why it should do 
any better than the “false” response (i.e. the relativist response), for which previous 
experiments, like Dinges & Zakkou themselves, do not find much support. These 
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complications could have been avoided by employing the standard design for 
experiments of this sort, in which people are simply asked to what extent they agree with 
the claim that a previous perspectival assertion is true or false.5   
If these thoughts are on the right track, then the reason why the proposed 
contextualist response does little better than the relativist response is simply because 
there is something amiss in this particular formulation. To explore this possibility, I ran 
an experiment similar to the one reported by Dinges and Zakkou. The relativist response 
was left unchanged, the contextualist one was modified. Take the dislike to like situation, 
where Yumble is not deemed tasty at the context of utterance, yet considered tasty at 
the context of assessment. Instead of following up “What I said was true” with a 
potentially confusing second sentence (“Still, Yumble is tasty”), it was followed with what 
a contextualist would provide as the rationale of their truth-assessment: “At the time, I 
didn’t find Yumble tasty”. The revised formulation thus mirrors the structure of the 
relativist statement (“What I said was false. Yumble is tasty.”), in so far as here, too, the 
second sentence supports and explains the truth-assessment expressed by the first 
sentence of the response. In a nutshell, the revised design establishes parity between 
the two responses. Each of the responses points to the context that is deemed relevant 
for truth-evaluation according to the respective semantic view. The relativist response 
highlights the context of assessment, the contextualist one the context of utterance – 
and not something that simply does not play a role on that account.  
 
3.1 Participants 
A total of 294 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The IP address 
was restricted to participants from the US. In line with the preregistered criteria,6 55 
                                               
5 Dinges & Zakkou’s design is motivated by a critique of extant studies (2021, p. 7), which apparently run 
the risk of a normative confound by asking questions as to whether it is “appropriate” (Knobe & Yalcin, 
2014) to retract a certain claim, or whether the speaker is “required” to do so (Kneer, 2015, 2021a, 
Marques, ms). On Dinges & Zakkou’s view, such “permissibility-related judgments” might be sensitive to 
normative factors that go beyond linguistic rules (e.g. norms of morality or etiquette).  But even if there 
were reason to be concerned about a normative confound (I do not quite see how morality or etiquette 
could interfere in the short scenarios about the gustatory merits of bubblegum or fish sticks) this argument 
seems to miss the mark: The criticized questions test norms of retraction, not truth assessment, which is 
the topic of Dinges & Zakkou. As regards the latter, the cited papers simply test agreement with a 
proposed truth-evaluation. It is not evident what kind of normative confound could be lurking here or why 
this tried and tested methodology needs revision.  
6 https://aspredicted.org/J9F_7WW 
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participants who failed an attention check, took less than twenty seconds to answer the 
main questions or whose native tongue was not English were excluded, leaving a sample 
of 239 participants (female: 51%; age M=43 years, SD=13 years, range: 20–76 years ).  
 
3.2 Methods and Materials  
Participants read Dinges & Zakkou's Bubble Gum scenario (see Appendix). They were 
randomly assigned to either the dislike to like condition, or to the like to dislike 
condition. Following the original methodology, participants were asked how likely they 
were to respond with one of the following two claims (here reproduced for the like to 
dislike condition, the order was counterbalanced) on a scale of 0-100: 
 
(i) [Relativist (unchanged)] "What I said was false. Yumble is tasty." 
(ii) [Contextualist (revised)] "What I said was true. At the time I didn't find Yumble 
tasty." 
3.3 Results 
A mixed-design three-way ANOVA (Table 1) with order of presentation (relativist claim 
first v. second) and direction of preference reversal (dislike to like v. like to dislike) as 
between-subjects factors, and assessment (relativist v. contextualist) as within-subject 
factor revealed a significant effect of assessment (F(1, 235)=500.760, p<.001, 𝜂p2=.681, a 
large effect). All other factors, as well as all interactions were non-significant (all ps>.05). 
Figure 5 presents the results.  
 
 
IV DFn DFd F p 𝜂p2 
Order  1 235 1.691 0.195 0.007 
Direction  1 235 <0.001 0.975 <0.001 
Assessment  1 235 500.76 <0.001* 0.681 
Order*Direction 1 235 0.847 0.358 0.004 
Order*Assessment 1 235 0.31 0.578 0.001 
Direction*Assessment 1 235 0.068 0.795 <0.001 
Order*Direction*Assessment 1 235 0.019 0.890 <0.001 









Figure 5. Likelihood of uttering a contextualist (true) response and a relativist (false) response across 
directions of preference reversal. Error bars denote 95% Confidence Intervals.  
 
Given that the direction of preference reversal and the direction*assessment interaction 
were nonsignificant, there is no evidence for a direction effect of any sort. As is clearly 
visible from Figure 5, the results also testify against an Even Split result. Whereas in either 
direction of preference reversal the likelihood of giving the contextualist response 
exceeded 80% (and was significantly above the midpoint, one-sample t-tests, ps<.001), 
the likelihood of giving the relativist response was below 25% (significantly below the 
midpoint, one-sample t-tests, ps<.001). For both scenarios, the effect size of the 




Experiment 1 could not find support for the Even Split results reported by Zakkou & 
Dinges, according to which the likelihood of giving a contextualist and a relativist 
response sits somewhere around the midpoint. Instead the findings indicate strong 
support for truth-assessment along contextualist lines, and they challenge truth-
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assessment along relativist lines. The effect size for the difference in likelihood across 
response types is very large (Cohen’s ds>1.42). What is more, truth assessment is 
unaffected by the direction of preference reversal. The nonsignificant 
direction*assessment interaction suggests that there is no direction effect.  
One finding is particularly interesting: Although the relativist answer was not 
changed from Dinges & Zakkou’s experiments, the reported mean likelihood of 
responding in that way dropped from about 50% in their experiments to less than 25% 
in the present experiment. As in every empirical experiment, this might just be an oddity 
in the data. However, it need not be: If it were true, as hypothesized above, that the 
contextualist response sounds somewhat confusing or potentially contradictory in 
Dinges & Zakkou’s experiments, it might be that the relativist response held more appeal 
by comparison.7 Once the contextualist response is improved, the comparative appeal 
of the relativist response declines. To explore whether the distaste for the relativist 
response replicates I ran another experiment. So as to increase external validity, I 
switched to a forced-choice response mechanism where participants could select 
between the relativist response, the contextualist response, or neither.     
 
4. The Even Split – Experiment 2 
4.1 Participants 
A total of 158 participants were recruited online via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Following 
the preregistered criteria,8 13 participants who failed an attention check or took less than 
fifteen seconds to answer the main questions were excluded, leaving a sample of 145 
participants (female: 47%; age M=43 years, SD=14 years, range: 22–75 years).  
 
4.2 Methods and Materials  
The scenario and the conditions were the same as in Experiment 1. Participants were 
randomly assigned to either the like to dislike or the dislike to like condition of the 
Bubble Gum scenario.  This time, however, participants had to choose amongst three 
options: the contextualist response, the relativist response, or neither. In the dislike to 
                                               
7 As detailed, the two responses were judged independently. But given that they were presented on the 
same screen, it is perfectly plausible that the merits of each response were assessed with an eye to the 
alternative.    
8 https://aspredicted.org/GP2_HCK 
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like vignette, where Paul doesn’t like Yumble at the context of utterance, yet comes to 
like it later, for instance, the question read (labels in square brackets omitted):  
 
Please tell us which of the following responses you'd be more likely to give to Paul 
(if any) in the given context: 
 [Relativist] “What I said was false. Yumble is tasty.” 
 [Contextualist] “What I said was true. I didn’t find Yumble tasty at the time.” 
 [Neither] “Neither.” 
 
4.3 Results 
The results are graphically represented in Figure 6. As in the previous experiment, more 
than three in four participants opted for the contextualist response (as binomial tests 
show, significantly above chance – i.e. 33%, ps<.001, and significantly above the mid-
point, ps<.001). Agreement with the relativist response was even less pronounced than 
in Experiment 1 and under 10% in either condition (significantly below chance and the 
mid-point, ps<.001).  
 
 
Figure 6. Proportion of responses (forced-choice) across direction of preference reversal. Error bars 
denote 95% confidence intervals.  
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The fact that hardly anyone opted for the option “neither response” (significantly below 
chance and the mid-point, ps<.001) suggests that people are happy with a contextualist 
response as proposed. Interestingly, there is a bit of a direction effect this time: 
Agreement with the contextualist response is somewhat more pronounced in the like to 
dislike condition than in the dislike to like condition, and vice-versa for the relativist 
response; a Fisher's Exact Test revealed a significant effect for the direction of change 
(p<.05, Cramer's V(2) =.21). However, there is little reason to investigate this further: 
Given that the effect size is once again small, yet this time goes in the opposite direction 
as in the original studies and is absent in Experiment 1 above, there simply does not seem 
much of a systematic phenomenon (and less of a pressing one given the absence of the 
Even Split effect).  
 
4.4 Discussion 
Consistent with the majority of results for taste predicates and epistemic modals in the 
empirical literature generally as well as the findings reported in Experiment 1, the second 
replication of Dinges & Zakkou’s study also supports a contextualist semantics of 
perspectival claims. Note that, once again, we found strong evidence against relativism, 
although for the relativist response the exact same formulation was employed as in 
Dinges & Zakkou’s original studies. But if support for the unchanged relativist response 
drops away once a plausible contextualist response is available, the external validity of 
Dinges & Zakkou’s results is in doubt.    
 
5. The Even Split – Experiment 3 
 
The majority of empirical findings concerning the truth assessment of perspectival claims 
support contextualist predictions and challenge relativist predictions. This pattern arises 
in experiments where the perspectival claim is simply specified as true or false without 
further details and participants are asked whether they agree or disagree with this 
evaluation. The previous two experiments have shown that the same pattern is found 
with likelihood-of-response judgments where the contextualist and relativist answers 
invoke those contexts that are of relevance for the respective positions – the context of 
utterance in the contextualist case, and the context of assessment in the relativist case. 
The diverging findings of Dinges & Zakkou, I have argued, are explained by the fact that 
their contextualist response only makes mention of the context of assessment – a context 
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that is irrelevant for contextualist truth assessment, and thus triggers a sense of 
confusion. Once this is rectified, not only does the contextualist response receive 
pronounced support, but the unchanged relativist response is deemed inadequate.  
In line with the suggestions of one of the editors – and in the hope of putting all 
remaining skepticism to rest – I have run a final experiment employing Dinges & Zakkou’s 
methodology. In this version the contextualist and relativist response mention both the 
context of utterance and the context of assessment. To make the responses as intuitive 
as possible, the context deemed relevant by each of the two positions is mentioned first. 
So in the dislike to like situation, where the speaker has said that Yumble is not tasty, the 
contextualist response is "What I said was true. At the time Yumble wasn't tasty to me 
[reference to Cu], although it's tasty to me now [reference to Ca]." The relativist response 
is “What I said was false. Yumble is tasty to me now [reference to Ca], although at the 
time it wasn’t tasty to me [reference to Cu].”  
 
5.1 Participants 
A total of 262 participants were recruited online via Amazon Mechanical Turk. In line with 
the preregistered criteria, 9 80 participants who failed an attention test, were not native 
speakers of the English language or took less than twenty seconds to answer the main 
questions were excluded, leaving a sample of 182 participants (female: 46%; age M=41 
years, SD=13 years, range: 20–91 years).  
 
5.2 Methods and Materials  
The scenario and the conditions were the same as in Experiment 1. Participants were 
randomly assigned to either the like to dislike or the dislike to like condition of the 
Bubble Gum scenario. On a scale of 0-100, participants again had to report how likely 
they were to give either of the two responses. This time the responses read:  
   
 Dislike to like    
[Relativist] "What I said was false. Yumble is tasty to me now, although at the time 
it wasn't tasty to me." 




[Contextualist] "What I said was true. At the time Yumble wasn't tasty to me, 
although it's tasty to me now." 
 
Like to dislike 
[Relativist] "What I said was false. Yumble is not tasty to me now, although at the 
time it was tasty to me." 
[Contextualist] "What I said was true. At the time Yumble was tasty to me, 
although it's not tasty to me now." 
 
5.3 Results 
A mixed-design ANOVA (Table 2) with direction of preference reversal (dislike to like v. 
like to dislike) as between-subjects factor and assessment (relativist v. contextualist) as 
within-subjects factor revealed a significant effect of assessment 
(F(1,180)=241.64, p<.001, 𝜂p2=.573, a large effect). Direction of preference reversal was 
nonsignificant (p=.484), the interaction was significant though the effect size was once 
again small (F(1, 180)=5.92, p=.016, 𝜂p2=.032). Figure 7 presents the results.  
 
 
Figure 7. Likelihood of uttering a contextualist (true) and relativist (false) response across directions of 
preference reversal. Error bars denote 95% Confidence Intervals.  
 
Consistent with the two previous experiments, the findings support contextualism and 
challenge relativism. In either direction of preference reversal the mean likelihood of 
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giving the contextualist response exceeded 75% (significantly above the midpoint, one-
sample t-tests, ps<.001). Consistent with the findings from Experiment 1 and 2 and 
inconsistent with Dinges & Zakkou’s findings, the mean likelihood of responding with a 
relativist response was again very low (significantly below the midpoint, one sample t-
tests, ps<.001). For both scenarios, the effect size of the difference between contextualist 
and relativist response was large (Cohen’s ds>.97).  
 
5.4 Discussion 
Experiment 3 replicates the findings from Experiments 1 and 2 with different formulations 
of the responses. Overall, then, the results of the three experiments with distinct 
formulations and designs constitute support for contextualist truth assessment. The 
results of all three experiments (two of which used the exact same prompt for the relativist 
response as Dinges & Zakkou’s studies) cast doubt on the plausibility of relativist truth 
assessment. Given that, in total, about a dozen studies (differing with regards to scenario, 
type of perspectival claim, response mechanism and language, cf. Knobe & Yalcin, 2014, 
Kneer, 2015, 2021, Marques, ms) converge on the same pro-contextualist results, Dinges 
& Zakkou’s diverging findings seem to be owed to an idiosyncrasy in design choices.  
 
6. Retraction 
Knobe & Yalcin (2014), we saw above (section 2.4), report evidence supporting a 
retraction rule of sorts for epistemic modal claims whose prejacent is false at the context 
of assessment. Knobe (2021) has recently argued that similar behavior is to be expected 
in preference reversal cases for taste claims.  The evidence is surprising for two reasons: 
First, truth assessment of perspectival claims is near-uniformly sensitive to the context of 
utterance. Second (see section 2.3), recent evidence suggests that the norm of assertion 
(tout court) is nonfactive, so it would be odd in the extreme to find norms of retraction 
to be sensitive to propositional truth. In the following, I’d like to suggest that the 
astonishing findings are explained by the normative force invoked in the way Knobe & 
Yalcin formulated their retraction question.  
 
6.1 Normative Force 
Norms come in different kinds and flavours. On the one end of the spectrum concerning 
normative force, we find prescriptive norms (one ought to do x) and proscriptive norms 
(one ought not to do x). Strong norms, concerned with what one ought, should or must 
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do, contrast with weaker ones regarding what it is appropriate or permissible to do, or 
what one may do. Whereas strong norms entail their weaker equivalent – what one 
should do must at least be appropriate or permissible, the reverse is not the case:  The 
fact that doing x might be permissible or appropriate does not entail that one should or 
ought to do x. If doing x is permissible, it can also be permissible to refrain from doing 
x. If, however, one must or ought to do x, it is standardly inacceptable to not do x.  
Philosophical accounts concerning norms of assertion standardly invoke strong 
force: In order to be in a position to assert that x, one “must” (Williamson, 2000) or 
“should” (Douven, 2006; Turri, 2013) fulfil certain epistemic conditions (be it knowledge, 
justified belief or something else). Norms of retraction tend to be formulated in similar 
fashion. Dummett (1978, p. 20), for instance writes that “[t]here’s a well-defined 
consequence of an assertion proving incorrect [false], namely that the speaker must 
withdraw it.“ As quoted above, MacFarlane’s Reflexive Retraction Rule states that “[a]n 
agent in context c2 is required to retract an (unretracted) assertion of p made at c1 if p 
is not true as used at c1 and assessed from c2.”  
A potential reason why Knobe & Yalcin’s findings in the Boston experiment 
(quoted above) differ strongly from the majority of results (including their own 
Experiment 3) is presumably this: Rather than testing a prescriptive norm as to whether 
Sally, the speaker, is required to retract her epistemic modal claim whose prejacent is 
false at the context of assessment, they ask people whether “[i]t would be appropriate 
for Sally to take back what she said.” It is, however, entirely possible that for a retraction 
to be appropriate, or permissible, without there being any requirement to do so. In order 
to explore whether people would also be willing to impose such a requirement on Sally, 
I reran the Knobe & Yalcin’s experiment manipulating the formulation (also previously 
done in Kneer, 2015, Ch.6). In one version, the retraction question was left exactly as 
phrased by Knobe & Yalcin, the other asked whether Sally is “required to take back what 
she said”.  
 
6.2 Participants 
A total of 196 participants were recruited online via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The IP 
address was restricted to the United States. 37 participants who failed an attention check 
or took less than fifteen seconds to answer the main questions were excluded, leaving a 




6.3 Methods and Materials 
In a between-subjects experiment, participants were presented with Knobe & Yalcin’s 
Boston vignette (see above, section 2.2). There were two conditions: One used Knobe 
& Yalcin’s original formulation of the retraction question invoking “appropriate … to take 
back” (RetractionWeak). The other formulation (RetractionStrong) followed MacFarlane’s 
formulation of the reflexive retraction rule and asked whether Sally is “required to take 
back” what she said:  
  
 [RetractionWeak] It would be appropriate for Sally to take back what she said.  
 [RetractionStrong] Sally is required to take back what she said.  
 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions.  
 
6.4 Results  
The results are graphically represented in Figure 8.  A one-way ANOVA (see Appendix) 
revealed a significant effect of formulation (‘retraction appropriate’ v. ‘retraction 
required’; F(1, 157)= 56.11, p<.001, 𝜂p2=.265, a large effect). Agreement with the claims 
that it is appropriate for Sally to take back what she said was significantly above the 
midpoint (M=5.75, p<.001), replicating the findings of Knobe & Yalcin. Agreement with 
the claim that Sally is required to take back what she said, however, significantly below 
the midpoint (M=3.41, p=.020),10 replicating the findings from Kneer (2015, ms) and 
                                               
10 Advocates of relativism might sense hope in light of the fact that the mean is not that much below the 
midpoint (for arguments of this sort, see e.g. Beddor & Egan, 2018, § 4.1). Two points: First, what the 
relativist predicts is significant agreement with a required retraction claim, i.e. a mean rating that is not 
only somewhat below or nonsignificantly different from the midpoint, but significantly above the midpoint. 
Differently put, she predicts means of the magnitude we find for the “appropriate” formulation of the 
retraction claim, and the effect size of the difference between the two formulations here is instructive: it’s 
very large (d=1.19).  Second, the means of this particular experiment – such is the nature of empirical 
research – simply seem to be a little higher than in related studies. In Kneer (2015, Exp.5) the mean 
retraction results for Knobe & Yalcin’s scenario is M=3.2 (SD=2.2); Marques (ms, Exp.1) reports near-
identical results for English speakers and even lower means (M=2.9) for native Spanish speakers (ms, 
Exp.2). For a similar, yet slightly different scenario (China, Kneer 2015, Exp.3) mean agreement with 
required retraction is considerably lower (M=1.6, SD=1.2).  
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Marques (ms) who reports similar findings for native Spanish speakers. The effect size of 




Figure 8. Agreement with proposed retraction across formulation (‘retraction appropriate’ v. ‘retraction 
required’). Error bars denote standard errors. 
  
6.5 Discussion 
The results suggest that there is no requirement to retract an epistemic modal claim from 
a context of assessment at which its prejacent is known to be true. However, under 
certain circumstances (such as those of the scenario) it is deemed nonetheless 
appropriate to do so. Knobe & Yalcin explain the latter finding thus: 
 
One possible approach would be to view retraction as a phenomenon whereby 
speakers are primarily indicating that they no longer want a conversational 
common ground incorporating the update associated with a sentence that they 
previously uttered. On this approach, what is retracted is a certain conversational 
update; retraction is in part a means of undoing or disowning the context change 
or update performed by a speech act. (2014, p.17) 
 
This conclusion dovetails nicely with some interesting observations by Khoo (2015), 
which served as inspiration for Knobe & Yalcin (for related discussion see also Khoo & 
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Knobe, 2018). Much of the literature on disagreement, Khoo argues, makes the following 
assumption:  
 
Rejecting is contradicting: to reject an assertion just is to claim that what is 
asserted by it is false.  (2015, p. 515) 
 
This assumption, however, is misconceived. Although it’s rather uncontroversial that, 
most times, in rejecting an assertion, one intends to flag it as false, this need not always 
be the case. Here are three examples:  
 
A: Jim ate some of the cookies from last night. 
B: No, he ate all of the cookies from last night. (Khoo, 2015, p. 517) 
 
A, B and C are sharing a flat and the kitchen tends to be a mess.  
A: “I made B clean up the kitchen last night.” 
B: “No. You asked me to clean up the kitchen and I did it.” 
 
A and B are wondering whether the bank is open (it’s a Saturday). A has just called 
a friend who told A that the bank was open last Saturday.  
A:  The bank is open today.  
B:  No, the bank might be open today. Banks are never open on national holidays, 
and we still don’t know whether today is a national holiday. (Khoo, 2015, p. 516) 
 
As Grice (1989) observed, communication is not limited to what is said (the semantic 
content) but frequently revolves around what is meant, which includes conversational 
implicatures. In the first two examples, although what is said by A is true, B still has 
grounds to reject the assertions due to the fact that they carry certain objectionable 
implicature: That Jim ate some but not all of the cookies or that A had the authority or 
power to force B to clean up the kitchen. Concerning the third example, and epistemic 
modals more generally, Khoo suggests what he calls the Update Observation:  
 
The Update Observation: generally, assertively uttering an epistemic possibility 
sentence involves proposing that it not be common ground that its prejacent is 
false. (Thus, generally, the communicative impact of assertively uttering an 
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epistemic possibility sentence will involve the property of not having as a member 
the negation of its prejacent.) (2015, p. 528) 
 
Whether we are, like Khoo, or Knobe & Yalcin, inclined to invoke a Stalnakerian (1978, 
1999, 2002) framework or else Grice’s theory of implicature to explain rejections not 
aimed at the truth value of the proposition expressed doesn’t matter much. What seems 
evident is that rejecting a claim can go beyond objecting to its alleged falsity. Instead, 
one might be objecting to certain implicatures it carries on its heels and/or to certain 
updates of the common ground it tends to engender.  
I find the explanation of Khoo and Knobe & Yalcin deeply plausible. It sheds light 
on our communicative practices in general, and the conversational move of retraction 
more particularly. Note, however, that data as to what kinds of (nonrequired) moves in 
communication are appropriate, permissible, or commendable does not have any 
particular impact on the quest for a constitutive or central norm of assertion, and neither 
does it matter much for the contextualism/relativism debate. Assertion is governed by a 
plethora of peripheral rules (concerning clarity, precision, relevance, etc.), none of which 
can be expected to be core to the characterization of the practice itself. Moreover, the 
dispute between contextualists and relativists concerns the truth-conditional semantics 
of perspectival claims, and weak norms of retraction, just like other peripheral norms, 
simply do not matter for this debate. I would thus like to resist any suggestions that data 
of this sort, which is not predicted by any of the three main theories of perspectival 
claims, requires “amendments” of any kind (Khoo, 2015), or revive hope for (some 
version of) relativism (Beddor & Egan, 2018, § 4.1) – for the simple reason that said 




The debate between contextualism and relativism revolves around two points of 
contention: Truth assessment, i.e. the question whether the extension of perspectival 
claims is assessment-sensitive on the one hand, and whether such claims are governed 
by a norm of retraction on the other. The content of the contentious norm is to invoke 
propositional truth at the context of assessment, and its force is prescriptive (when 
appropriately challenged, one is required to retract a previous perspectival claim).  
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Consistent with the majority of findings from the empirical literature on 
perspectival claims, we have found that the truth assessment of taste claims is sensitive 
to features of the context of utterance and not to features of the context of assessment 
(Experiments 1 - 3). This invalidates the relativist position not only with regards to truth 
assessment itself, but also with respect to a norm of retraction whose requirements 
allegedly track assessment-sensitive propositional truth. If the truth of perspectival claims 
is not assessment-sensitive, a situation where MacFarlane’s reflexive retraction rule takes 
grip can simply not arise. As argued, there are further, independent reasons to question 
said rule: Converging evidence from the empirical literature on the norm of assertion 
suggests that the latter is nonfactive, and that one is warranted in asserting false beliefs 
for which one has good reasons. This suggests that norms of retraction are not tied to 
propositional truth of any sort. It would be odd if one were held to stricter normative 
standards for retracting a claim than for asserting it in the first place.  
Given that the norm of assertion – and by extension the norm of retraction – is 
most likely not sensitive to propositional truth, and given that the truth of perspectival 
claims is not assessment-sensitive anyways, the findings reported by Knobe & Yalcin 
might come as a surprise. Experiment 4 has shown that for their scenario, too, there is 
no prescriptive norm according to which one is required to retract an epistemic modal 
claim, whose prejacent turns out false at the context of assessment. People, do, however, 
deem it appropriate to retract such a claim, in line with Knobe & Yalcin’s original findings.  
The retraction findings lend support to an explanation of the sort proposed by 
Khoo (2015) and Knobe & Yalcin (2014), according to which updating of the common 
ground can be effected due to reasons that go beyond propositional truth. Importantly 
though, norms of this sort simply do not bear on the discussion concerning a plausible 
truth-conditional semantics of perspectival claims (see also Marques, 2018 on this point). 
The kinds of norms that let us draw inferences about semantics are unlikely to be loose 
principles of guidance as to what it is permissible, commendable or appropriate to say 
and do – if one so fancies. Rather, rules of this sort can be expected to carry strong 
normative force – they regulate what one is required to do or must do – just like the 
kinds of norms proposed by MacFarlane, which we found invalidated by the data.11  
 
                                               
11 For comments and help, I would like to thank Joshua Knobe, Teresa Marques, Neri Marsili, Marc-André 
Zehnder and the editors. I do not want to imply that any of them agree with me. This work was supported 
by a Swiss National Science Foundation Grant (PZ00P1_179912). 
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